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The Modularity of the ‘Revolutionary’ Repertoire of Action
in Egypt: Origins and Appropriation by Different Players
Clément Steuer, Oriental Institute (ASCR).
Abstract: 
The  Egyptian  ‘revolutionary’ repertoire  of  action,  that  is  to  say  the  repertoire  used  by  the
protesters of January 2011, was characterized by a combination of several features: occupation of
a symbolic place; ‘horizontal’ forms of organization; recourse to new electronic information and
communication technologies (especially social networks); and rhetoric centered around universal
values such as dignity, social justice, human rights and democracy. This repertoire was born as a
result of the merging of two parallel cycles of mobilization, which had actually started during the
previous decades, one animated by activists from the educated middle class, and the other by
workers struggling for economic and social reforms. After the fall of Hosni Mubarak in February
2011, it demonstrated its extreme modularity, being appropriated by different players from all
sections of the political spectrum, from the Salafist hāzimūn to proponents of the military power.
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The Egyptian protest movement of January 2011, which led to the ousting of president
Hosni Mubarak, has become almost paradigmatic, inasmuch as scholars have begun to
use it to describe other protest movements which occurred thereafter in places as diverse
as North America (Kerton, 2012) and India (Chatterji, 2013). The most prominent feature
of the 25 January uprising was probably the peaceful occupation of a particular square,
which symbolized the national dimension and the revolutionary nature of the movement.
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Over the past six years, Tahrir Square has been mirrored in many places (for instance:
Yemen, Bahrain, Spain, US, Turkey, France) This phenomenon was actually anything but
new when  it  took  place  in  2011  (McCurdy,  Feigenbaum,  & Frenzel,  2016),  but  the
novelty  came  from  its  association  with  some  additional  features:  non-hierarchical,
‘horizontal’ forms  of  organization;  recourse  to  on-line  social  networks;  and  rhetoric
centered  around  universal  values.  Altogether,  these  various  features  created  a
‘revolutionary’  repertoire  of  action,  which  was  distinct  from  previous  Egyptian
repertoires, even though it was based on them. I will retain here the minimalist definition
of repertoire advanced by Charles Tilly: ‘a limited set of routines that are learned, shared,
and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice’ (1995, p. 42). A particular
repertoire is the historical product of years of struggle, and exists between a particular
group of protesters and a political regime.
The Egyptian revolutionary repertoire coexisted with other forms of protest–sometimes
more violent, as was the case on 28 January 2011, particularly in Suez, or as used by the
football ‘Ultras’ (Woltering, 2013)–but constituted what could be described as a dominant
model, this dominance being highlighted by the way it has been since imitated, both in
Egypt  and  in  many  other  places  around  the  world. Indeed,  this  repertoire  has
demonstrated its extreme modularity, within the context of the opening-up of the political
arena and the rolling back of the influence of the security apparatus over a two and a half
year  period.  I  am following  here  the  classical  Tarrow definition  of  modularity:  ‘the
capacity of a form of collective action to be utilized by a variety of social actors, against a
variety of targets, either alone, or in combination with other forms’ (1994, p. 33).  The
revolutionary  repertoire  proved to  be  modular  in  nature,  encompassing  what  Takeshi
Wada calls the ‘four dimensions of transferability’: actors, targets, issues and locations
(2012,  p.  550).  Regarding the  dimension of  the  actors,  especially,  this  repertoire  has
shown an important modularity, since it has been appropriated not only by part of the
Islamists, but also by some of the proponents of the old regime. Yet, in a given society, a
set of tactics is usually almost exclusively used by certain groups. When another group
starts to use this set of tactics, it could result in a failure of this protest movement, or in a
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restructuring of the “division of protest” (Orkibi, 2017). Using the example of the Israeli
demobilized reservists’ protest in the 1970s, Eithan Orkibi argues that the appropriation,
by the mainstream society, of a repertoire hitherto affiliated with marginal and radical
groups contributes to its legitimization (ibid.) We will see, through the Egyptian case, that
this  assertion  is  highly dependent  of  the context,  and that  such an appropriation can
sometimes results in the opposite.
In this paper, I discuss the origins and main features of such a repertoire, as well as its
development and modularity within the national Egyptian arena from 25 January 2011 to
30  June  2013.  I  conclude  with  an  evocation  of  the  possible  abandonment  of  this
repertoire by Egyptian protesters.
Historical origins and main features
The  Egyptian  revolutionary  repertoire  was  born  as  a  result  of  the  merging  of two
previously existing repertoires: the ‘civil-democratic’ (De Smet, 2014) repertoire and the
‘workers’ one. Both of them developed as the result of two parallel cycles of mobilization
that had consolidated and structured themselves over the previous decade: the first one
was created by activists from all shades of the political spectrum, who made claims for
more democracy and political openness, and the second one was used by the industrial
workers,  who  protested  against  neo-liberal  economic  reforms.  They  have  long  been
described  as  opposite  and  complementary  movements,  the  first  one  associated  with
political  claims  and the  second with  bread-and-butter  demands  (Shahāta,  2010).  But,
actually, both of them were political and social at the same time: on the one hand, the
mobilized workers made political claims as early as 2007 (Beinin, 2011), and, on the
other hand, the civil-democratic movement was animated by activists from the educated
middle class, who felt as much threatened by precarity as the workers did (Duboc, 2011).
The 2000s witnessed the birth of several initiatives that brought together activists from
across  the  full  political  spectrum (in  solidarity  with  the  Palestinian  Intifada  in  2001,
against the invasion of Iraq in 2003). In 2004, these movements  began to challenge the
political order, with the creation of the National Movement for Change (Kifaya), which
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aimed at preventing a renewed mandate for Hosni Mubarak (Vairel, 2006).  During that
time, the youth movement began to gain autonomy (creation of the ‘Youth for Change’),
and made its first attempt to connect with the labor movement four years later, in 2008.
The latter had been propelled by the acceleration of neo-liberal reforms that had been
enacted  since  2004.  In  October  of  that  year,  the  workers  from  the  ESCO  Spinning
Company began a strike in order to protest against the privatization of their factory, and
obtained some economic gains. Most importantly,  this strike established that the state
would not seek to exercise violent repression against striking workers, as it had before.
This success opened up the doors for other workers (Beinin, 2011, p. 192). In December
2006,  another  strike  erupted  in  the  city  of  Mahalla.  Once  again,  workers  achieved
substantial gains. However, the largest mobilization of this period was not organized by
blue-collar workers, but by real estate tax collectors employed by local authorities. In the
fall  of  2007,  they  claimed–and  obtained–wage  parity  with  their  colleagues  working
directly for the Ministry of Finance. Their movement involved strikes, civil disobedience,
demonstrations, and finally an eleven-day sit-in in front of the Ministry (Beinin, 2011).
These two kinds of social movement shared a core set of common features. Firstly, they
were organized outside the boundaries of political parties or other official institutions,
such as the trade unions. Challenging the policies of the regime, and without support
from the Egyptian Trade Union Federation, which was closely controlled by the state and
the ruling party, the workers relied mainly on informal, local networks (Beinin, 2009;
Duboc,  2011).  The  second  feature  shared  by  all  these  protest  movements  was  the
emphasis on universal values, expressed in terms of ‘rights’, which had been brandished
since the 1980s, not only by the civil-democratic movements (El Khawaga, 2003), but
also by the struggling workers (Stork, 2011).
In January 2008, the strike committee of the  Ghazl Al-Mahalla company called for a
national strike on 6 April, in support of a claim to establish a minimum monthly wage.
During the previous weeks, young middle class activists had been using blogs and social
networks  in  order  to  show  solidarity  with  the  workers  of  Mahalla.  Although  this
particular mobilization was largely a failure, it constituted the first major attempt to build
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a link between the workers and the mobilized middle class youth movement (Cole, 2012,
pp. 488-489), and it gave birth to one of the most important youth organization, the 6
April Youth Movement, which played a key role during the 2011 revolution. In addition,
the  2008 solidarity  initiative saw the first  use  of  on-line social  networks  in  order  to
organize protest movements in Egypt. This latter protest tool constitutes another of the
main features of the revolutionary repertoire (Allam, 2014).
This repertoire is characterized by the combination of all the above-mentioned features,
as well as the occupation of a symbolic place. However, even this latter characteristic has
a history, which can be traced back to the development of the two kinds of mobilization
described above. Demonstrations were organized in Tahrir Square as early as 2001 in
support of the Palestinian people (Vairel, 2006). Besides this, occupations have been a
traditional tool used in the Egyptian workers struggle since at least the 1970s (Beinin,
2011). Moreover, demonstrations were conducted in 2008 in the main square of Mahalla.
Indeed, although Tahrir Square became the major battlefield during the 2011 uprising–
symbolizing the national dimension of the movement–other squares were occupied in the
same way in many parts of the country.
Developments and modularity within the national arena
Repertoires  of  contention  are  built  historically,  through  social  and political  struggles
(Tarrow,  1993),  and  the  above-mentioned  workers  and  civil-democratic  repertoires
evolved  over  decades,  before  converging  around  2009-2010  and  giving  birth  to  the
revolutionary repertoire. The latter continued to evolve thereafter, due to the change of
the regime. Meanwhile, it has also been appropriated by other players, whose claims are
very different–not to say totally opposite–from those of the revolutionaries.
During the 2011 uprising,  the movement was animated  by actors  emerging from the
cycles of mobilization described above: the 6 April Movement called for a demonstration
on  25  January,  along  with  Kifaya  and  other  youth  organizations.  Moreover,  on  30
January, in Tahrir Square, some independent trade-unionists announced the formation of
an ‘Egyptian Independent Trade Union Federation’ (Clément, Duboc, & El Shafei, 2011).
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Then, during the first few months following the ousting of Mubarak, Tahrir Square was
regularly occupied by the  same actors,  demanding the fulfillment  of  their  social  and
political  claims  But  during  that  time,  with  the  workers  movements  staying  focused
mainly on the social and economic claims– advocating ‘substantive democracy’ (Beinin,
2012)–the  middle-class  activists  mobilized  principally  in  favor  of  constitutional  and
political reforms (Cole, 2012, p. 506 ; Brecht, 2014, pp. 30-31).
The dominant repertoire of the revolutionaries remained  the same, at least until January-
February 2012 (Gerbaudo, 2012, pp. 13-14), and this preeminence of the ‘Tahrir’ model,
at a time when the political situation was quickly evolving, probably contributed to the
weakening of the movement. Nevertheless, innovative forms of activism started to appear
at  the same time, and even more so under the rule  of Muhammad Morsi:  the use of
artistic expression, the organization of human chains, ‘civil disobedience’ on the scale of
whole cities... (Stadnicki, 2013).
Meanwhile,  Islamist  and  old  regime  forces  sought  to  appropriate  the  revolutionary
legitimacy, beginning with the revolutionary repertoire. On 29 July 2011, the Muslim
Brotherhood  and  the  Salafist  Nur  party  occupied  Tahrir  Square,  demanding  the
establishment  of  a  religious  state.  These  forces  sometimes  demonstrated  with
revolutionaries,  as was the case on 18 November 2011, or in June 2012, in  order  to
remind the army leaders of their promise to pass power to officially elected civilians.
However, they remain hierarchical centralized organizations, which have always failed to
appropriate  any features  of  the  revolutionary  repertoire,  other  than  the  occupation  of
Tahrir Square and the use of a ‘revolutionary’ rhetoric.
The most extreme example of the appropriation of the revolutionary pattern by Islamist
activists is the appearance of the decentralized and very informal  hāzimūn movement,
which  adopted  all  the  features  of  the  revolutionary  repertoire  described  above.  The
designation hāzimūn means ‘determined people’, but at the same time it is a reference to
the first name of the tutelary figure of this movement, the ‘revolutionary sheikh’, Hazim
Salah Abu Ismail (Lacroix & Shalata, 2016). In April 2012, the followers of the latter
occupied Tahrir Square night and day for several weeks. They even eclipsed the 2012
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Workers’ Day celebration, when only a few dozens of leftists and unionists gathered in
Tahrir.  Due  to  the  massive  Salafist  presence  at  the  center  of  the square,  leftist
demonstrators  remained  confined  to  an  area  in  front  of  the  doors  of  the  central
administration building.
The revolutionary repertoire has been progressively appropriated by proponents of the
military power as well. Firstly, the latter tried to occupy alternative squares, as a symbol
of their opposition to the revolutionary and/or Islamist claims. Thus, in November 2011,
as  the youth movements  were occupying Tahrir  Square and violently  confronting the
police in Muhammad Mahmud Street, the pro-military forces were demonstrating a few
miles away in the Abbaseya neighborhood. In the same way, in June 2012, between the
end of the presidential election and the official proclamation of the results, the supporters
of Muhammad Morsi were in the process of occupying Tahrir Square, when the followers
of  his  rival–General  Ahmad Shafiq–were gathering  at  the  memorial  of  the  Unknown
Soldier in Nasr City. 
A few months later, under the rule of Muhammad Morsi, the pro-military forces were
able  to  gain  some revolutionary  legitimacy,  namely  by  supporting  the  claims  of  the
workers and the youth movement, who were both opposed to Muslim Brotherhood rule.
A new  youth  organization  was  created  during  the  spring  of  2013,  calling  for  early
presidential  elections.  This  new  movement,  Tamarrod,  shared  all  the  features  of  the
revolutionary repertoire. Founded by young Nasserites, it gained the official support of
many revolutionary organizations, such as Kifaya and the 6 April Movement, but also of
businessmen–such as Naguib Sawiris,  a telecoms tycoon and the founder of the Free
Egyptian party–, and even of the deep state (Hubbard & Kirkpatrick, 2013; Barbary &
Adib Doss, 2014). It called for massive demonstrations on 30 June 2013, which resulted
in the ousting of Morsi by the military, four days later.
Conclusion
Since the ousting of Muhammad Morsi, both revolutionaries and Islamist activists have
lost control of Tahrir Square. On 25 January 2014, the symbolic place was occupied by
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pro-Sisi demonstrators, demanding that their champion should run for president. After the
bloody dispersal of the Rabaa and Nahda sit-ins in August 2013, the supporters of former
president Muhammad Morsi organized many demonstrations in many places–including
university campuses–but never in Tahrir Square. Since the adoption of the protest law in
November 2013,  the revolutionary youth organizations have faced similar  conditions,
with  small groups gathering for a few moments in different places before dispersing.
They seem to have returned to the pre-revolutionary repertoire, when they were racing
‘through the streets of Cairo attempting to find an open space to gather’ (Vairel, 2011, p.
41). Currently, it feels as if the reconstitution of the security apparatus, as well as the
need to distance themselves from the Islamists, has made the revolutionary repertoire
obsolete for the secular opponents of the Egyptian regime, at least for the time being.
Many  of  them  now  appear  to  favor  the  pursuit  of  local  initiatives  with  concrete
immediate  objectives  and,  in  the foreseeable  future,  do not  see  any opportunities  for
nationwide  actions  aimed  at  regime  change.  Nevertheless,  following  a  short  respite
during the second semester of 2013, social unrest has continued to erupt from time to
time in different sectors.
Then,  if  the  revolutionary  repertoire  proved  itself  extremely  modular–regarding
especially the dimensions of the locations and the actors–it appears at the same time as
being very dependent of the context, since it was used only for a relatively short period of
time (two years and half). How can we interpret the abandonment of this repertoire? We
can see it as a mere outcome of a shift in the structure of political opportunities, but we
can also argue that it is due to the restructuring of the Egyptian “division of protest”: this
repertoire eventually proved itself inefficient for the revolutionary activists, but also for
the Islamists. And regarding the pro-military activists, if they succeeded while using this
repertoire, they do not need it anymore, since they do not have any reasons to take the
street  for  the  current  period.  Then,  the  appropriation  of  this  set  of  tactics  by  the
mainstream society did not result in its legitimization. On the contrary, this repertoire was
widely  perceived  as  legitimate  during  the  2011-2013,  and  the  counter-revolutionary
groups  appropriated  it  because  of  this  legitimacy  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  2011
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revolution. In so doing, they contributed to de-legitimatize not only this repertoire, but
also the founding moment it was associated with.
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